ABSTRACT. In this paper, we discuss the notion of Share functions for cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions or simply fuzzy cooperative games. We obtain the Share functions for some special classes of fuzzy games, namely the fuzzy games in proportional value form and the fuzzy games in Choquet integral form. The Shapley Share and Banzhaf Share functions for these classes are derived.
Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N, v) , where N is a finite set of players and v, a characteristic function defined on 2 N that assigns every subset (coalition) a real number called its worth giving zero worth to the empty coalition. It is assumed that the players form binding agreements and the worth is generated under cooperation by virtue of this binding agreement. A solution to a cooperative game is an n-dimensional vector of real numbers that assigns each player her payoff. A value function for TU-games is a function that assigns a solution to every cooperative game. A value function is efficient if the payoffs to the players add up to the worth of the grand coalition. The S h a p l e y value [12] and the B a n z h a f value [6] are perhaps the most famous efficient and inefficient values, respectively. Share functions for TU-games due to v a n d e r L a a n and v a n d e n B r i n k [16] are a type of solutions that assign to every game a vector whose components add up to one. A Share function determines how much share a player can get from the worth of the grand coalition and therefore is devoid of the efficiency requirement as opposed to the other standard value functions. Therefore a Share function simplifies the model formulation to a great extent. The Share function corresponding to the Shapley value (Banzhaf value) is the Shapley Share function (Banzhaf Share function). It is obtained by dividing the Shapley value (Banzhaf value) of each player by the sum of the Shapley values (Banzhaf values) of all players. Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions or simply fuzzy games are generalization of ordinary TU-games in the sense that participation of the players is considered here to be partial that ranges between 0 and 1, see [1] . A fuzzy coalition is a fuzzy subset of the player set N that assigns a membership grade to its members that represents player's rate of participation in it.
In this paper, we propose the notion of Share functions for fuzzy games. A set of axioms to characterize the Share function is proposed. Some interesting results pertaining to a special class of fuzzy games, namely the fuzzy games in Choquet integral and proportional value form are obtained. The Shapley Share function for this class is derived as an illustration of the model.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we compile the related definitions and results from the existing literature. Section 3 discusses the Share functions for fuzzy cooperative games. In Section 4, we discuss the Share functions for games in proportional value form followed by the Share functions for games in Choquet integral form along with their corresponding examples. Section 5 concludes.
Preliminaries
In this section, we compile the related definitions and results from [9] , [14] - [17] relevant to the development of the paper for ready reference. Let the player set N be fixed. 
The axiomatization of the Share function makes use of the notion of a carrier of a coalition which is defined as follows.
A SIMPLIFIED EXPRESSION OF SHARE FUNCTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES
The set of all carriers in K for v denoted by C(K| v ) is therefore given by
Similarly, the null player is defined as follow.
For any S ⊆ N , we denote by N (S), the set of
A solution of an n-person TU-game is an n-dimensional vector representing a distribution of payoffs. A value function on a subset C of G 0 (N ) is a function that assigns a solution to any game in C. A value function Φ is efficient on C if
of player i with respect to a game v ∈ G 0 (N ) and for all K ⊆ N is a weighted average value of the marginal contributions 
In what follows next we define the Share functions for a class of crisp games followed by the definitions of the corresponding Shapley and Banzhaf Share functions.
Share functions on the class of crisp games
Let μ : G 0 (N ) → R be a function assigning a real value to any game v
μ is linear on C if it is additive on C and for every v ∈ C and α ∈ R such that αv ∈ C it holds that μ(αv) = αμ (v) . Finally, we call μ symmetric on C if for every v ∈ C, every pair of symmetric players i, j ∈ N and every E ⊂ N ; E ⊃ {i, j}, such that the subgames E \ {i}, v E\{i} and E \ {j}, v E\{j} are in C, it holds that μ E \ {i},
In the following, we introduce the Share function with respect to a function μ : C → R on a class C of crisp games along the line of [15] which is both specific to the game and the coalition. Note that a Share function assigns to each player his share in the payoff v(K) of the coalition K ⊆ N , i.e., a Share function on a class C ⊆ G 0 (N ) of games is a function that gives player i her share in the value v(K) of the coalition K ⊆ N . The formal definition goes as follows.
Ò Ø ÓÒ 3º Let μ : C → R be given. A Share function on a set of games
such that the following axioms hold.
The following theorem is due to [16] . Note that a Share function is always dependent on the given additive function μ : C → R and therefore unless μ has a specific form as can be seen in the following theorems, we call it a μ-Share function. In the following we state the existence theorems of the Shapley and the Banzhaf Share functions for crisp games without proof.
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 1º
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 2º Let C ⊆ G 0 (N ) and μ S : C → R be defined by μ S (K, v) = v(K).
Then the Shapley Share function
is the unique μ S -Share function satisfying the Axioms S 1 − S 3 on the class C.
is the unique μ B -Share function satisfying the Axioms S 1 − S 3 on the class C.
Fuzzy cooperative games
In this section,we make a brief description of a cooperative game with fuzzy coalitions or in short a fuzzy cooperative game. We call x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ,x n ), 
A game v ∈ F G(N ) is said to be in proportional value form if it can be represented as,
The set of all fuzzy games in proportional value form is denoted by F G p (N ).
the cardinality of Q (s). We write the elements of Q (s) in the increasing order as h 1 < · · · < h q(s) . Then a game v ∈ F G (N ) is said to be a fuzzy game with Choquet integral form if,
The set of all fuzzy games with the Choquet integral form is denoted by
RAJIB BISWAKARMA -SURAJIT BORKOTOKEY -RADKO MESIAR
The next four theorems are of the existence and uniqueness of the Shapley and Banzhaf functions for the classes F G p (N ) and F G C (N ), respectively. 
, defined by
is a Shapley function in s for v ∈ F G C (N ), where
is the Shapley function of the crisp game v.
is a Banzhaf function in s for v ∈ F G C (N ), where
elsewhere.
A SIMPLIFIED EXPRESSION OF SHARE FUNCTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES

Share functions for fuzzy games
We now extend the notion of a Share function to the class F G(N ) of fuzzy games with player set N . Following its crisp counterpart we assume here also that the Share function assigns to each player her share in the payoff v(s) of the fuzzy coalition s ∈ L(N ). Similar to the crisp formulations we provide the following definitions for their fuzzy counterpart. 
the class F G(N ) of games if it is f-additive and if for any v on F G(N ) and s ∈ L(N ) it holds that μ(s, αv) = αμ(s, v) for any real number α such that αv ∈ F G(N ).
Ò Ø ÓÒ 9º
A real valued function μ : L(N ) × F G(N ) → R is called positive if μ(s, v) ≥ 0 ∀ v ∈ F G(N ), s ∈ L(N ).
Ò Ø ÓÒ 10º Given v ∈ F G(N ), s ∈ L(N ), based on s, a fuzzy coalition
s ∈ s f is called a carrier of s in v if for any t ∈ s f , v(t) = v(t ∧ s).
The set of carriers of s in v is denoted by S C (v, s). Let i ∈ N , and s ∈ L(N
that satisfies the following axioms, i.e., Axiom FS 1 -FS 3 along with Axiom FS 4 or Axiom FS 5 .
Axiom FS
Axiom FS 3 (f-Symmetry): If for i, j ∈ N and t ∈ s f with t i = t j = 0, we have
Axiom FS 4 (fμ-additivity): For any pair
, for any pair of real numbers a and b such that av 1 
It follows from the above definition that for any v ∈ F G(N ) and the function μ, a Share function Ψ μ gives a payoff Ψ μ i (s, v) to player i when she is involved in the fuzzy coalition s and satisfies the aforementioned axioms. In the following we define a Share function for a specific class of fuzzy games, namely the games in proportional value form and Choquet integral introduced by [10] .
Share functions on two special classes of fuzzy games
We discuss two particular classes of fuzzy games namely, fuzzy games in proportional value form and in Choquet integral form, respectively, and obtain their corresponding Share functions.
Share functions for fuzzy games in proportional value form
To discuss the existence and uniqueness of the Share function for fuzzy games in proportional value form we have to use some classical results from [12] . Recall that given a coalition T ∈ 2 N , the unanimity game w T is defined as follows.
where for any T ∈ 2 N , c T (v) are given above and u T is given by
So with the help of above theorem, v(s) can be re-written as follows:
Following theorem extends a similar theorem in [16] to the class F G p (N ).
P r o o f. The proof proceeds in the line of [16] . First we suppose Ψ μ satisfies f-efficiency and fμ-additivity. It follows that Ψ μ is μ-additive on G 0 (N ). Thus we have
Secondly, we will show that we can have at most one Share function Ψ μ :
be a function satisfying the four axioms. For a positively scaled unanimity game αu T ∈ F G p (N ), α > 0 and consequently a fuzzy carrier s ∈ s f for αu T ∈ F G p (N ), we obtain,
Again for αu T , α > 0 from (i) and (ii) clearly Ψ μ satisfies all the four axioms. Thus it follows that for any αu T , α > 0 the function Ψ μ given by (i) and (ii) is the Share function satisfying the axioms of f-efficiency, f-carrier and f-symmetry if and only if μ is f-additive.
The uniqueness of Ψ μ (s, v) follows immediately. We next show that Ψ μ (s, v) satisfies the four axioms for an arbitrary v. The assumption of f-additivity of μ ensures f-efficiency as in the case of crisp games. Consequently, the f-carrier axiom also follows. Third, for any t ∈ L(N ) with 
Further, the Share function Ψ μ ω as defined in Theorem 10 is given by,
In the following example we obtain the numerical values of the Share functions for a fuzzy game in proportional value form. 
Share functions on fuzzy games in the Choquet integral form
Following similar procedure as in Theorem 10, we can have for v ∈ F G C (N ),
It follows from the above discussion that v(S) can be re-written as
that satisfies the axioms of f-efficiency (FS 1 ), f-carrier (FS 2 ), f-symmetry (FS 3 ) and fμ-additivity (FS 4 ) if and only if μ is f-additive on F G C (N ).
P r o o f. The proof is similar to Theorem 9 and hence omitted.
Ì ÓÖ Ñ 14º For given positive numbers ω k with k = 1, 2, . . . , n, let the function μ ω be defined by
where
is the unique Share function satisfying the axioms of f-efficiency (FS 1 ), f-carrier (FS 2 ), f-symmetry (FS 3 ) and fμ ω -additivity (FS 4 ) on F G C (N ) wherever μ ω is positive. P r o o f. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 12 and hence omitted.
Examples of Share functions on fuzzy games in Choquet integral form
In this section, we discuss the Shapley and Banzhaf Share functions for fuzzy games in Choquet integral form.
Then the Shapley Share function Ψ μ S is the unique Share function satisfying the axioms of f-efficiency, f-carrier, f-symmetry and fμ S -linearity on F G C (N ).
. Then, we have that μ ω as defined in Theorem 11 given by
Further, the Share function Ψ μ S ω as defined in Theorem 11 is given by 
Conclusion
We have discussed Share functions under fuzzy environment. The Shapley Share function and Banzhaf Share function are obtained for the class F G p (N ) and F G C (N ) of fuzzy games in proportional value form and Choquet integral form, respectively. The characterizing properties are studied. In the future, Share functions for other classes of fuzzy games will be investigated.
